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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALVIN G. RHODES PUMP SALES 
and STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs/appellants, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and THE SECOND INJURY 
FUND, 
Defendants/respondents. 
Case No. 19163 
'~ -g 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS ~) 
NATURE OF THE CASE }_1' . ( 
5-J_,,) 
Wilbur G. Rhodes, an employee of appellan~ployer was 
injured in an industrial accident on May 1, 1978.~\c{aim was filed 
with the Industrial Commission by injured employee Wilbur G. Rhodes, 
against his employer Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales, and its insurance 
carrier, The State Insurance Fund, for an increase in his 20% permanent 
partial impairment rating previously agreed to by the Statement and 
Request settlement. The Second Injury Fund was also joined as a party 
~ursuant to Sections 35-1-68 and 69, U.C.A. The Industrial Commission 
•nt0r0d an order improperly apportioning benefits between the Second 
\Jl ·; Fund and the appe,llants. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIO" 
A hearing was held on March 25, 1982 boforP an Adr.ir,ic•c-
Law Judge to determine if the applicant's cleqree of impairment ha•I 
substantially increased since the Statement and Request settler-· c· 
Pursuant to that hearing, the Administrative Law Judqe, appointed, 
medical panel to make an impartial evaluation of the medical asoec:• 
(R. 114). The medical panel report indicated that the applicant's 
impairment of the lower back had not changed from the original 201 
impairment rating, but that 10% of this was due to pre-existing 
conditions. The medical panel also found that the applicant had a~ 
additional 5% pre-existing impairment for alcoholism (R. 122). 
Findings of the medical panel were adopted over the applic2 
objections when, on August 18, 1982, the Administrative Law Judae 
issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 130-1:: 
Motions for Review were filed by both the applicant, Wilbur G. Rhoc20 
(R. 137-138), and by Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales and State Insurance 
Fund (R. 139-141). 
On November 2 4, 19 82, an Amended Order was entered by the 
Industrial Commission which modified the decision of the Administra:. 
Law Judge (R. 152-153). A Motion for Review of the Amended Order ·,:" 
filed by the appellants, Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales and The State 
Insurance Fund, (R. 155-156), and an Answer to Motion for Revie"· wae 
filed by the respondent Second Injury Fund (R. 157-158). Subsec1u0c~-
a denial of a Motion for Review was entered by the Industrial 
Commission on March 23, 1982 (R. 159-161). The Petition fnr \·.'1 
Review was filed by plaintiffs/appellants herein on 111·r1l 22, 
(R. 167-169). 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek an order of this court modifying the order 
of the Industrial Commission which failed to properly apportion liability 
between appellants and the Second In1ury Fund as to temporary total 
disability compensation and medical expenses paid by the olaintiffs to 
the applicant Wilbur G. Rhodes and an order requiring the Second Injury 
Fund to reimburse the appellants for an overpayment of permanent 
partial disability compensation which amount was found to be pre-
existing the industrial accident. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal focuses entirely upon the interpretation that 
the Industrial Commission gave to the medical oanel's determination 
concerning the degree of Mr. Rhode's physical impairment which 
resulted from the industrial accident of May 1, 1978, as opposed 
to the physical impairment which was deemed pre-existing. Therefore, 
there appears to be no dispute as to the facts ~ se but there is 
a serious dispute as to the apportionment of liability which was 
refused by the Commission. 
On or about July 23, 1980, the State Insurance Funn and the 
applicant Rhodes entered into an agreement compensating the applicant 
for a 2oi permanent partial impairment sustained as a result of his 
industrial accident on May 1, 1978 (R. 1, 63-64). At that time there 
~as no medical evidence available to the appellants of any pre-existing 
impairment and the extent thereof. ~he treating physician did not 
hr"ak the impairment rating into increments of the pre-existing 
· ntage and the percentage due to the accident. (R. 159). 
Later, Mr. Rhodes aoplied for increased benefits (R. 3) 
_,_ 
alleging that his condition had changed substantially. After a 
hearing before the Administrative Law Judge on March 25, 1982, tr.'. 
medical aspects of the case were submittecl tn " rneclical r•anc1 
appointed by the Industrial Commission. The m0dical panc>l rr·1•rr•. 
indicated that Mr. Rhodes was suffering from a 10% imoairment •r:~ 
his industrial injury of May 1978 and 15% pre-existing the 
industrial event, combined together for a total of 24% impairment 
of the whole man (R. 122). These findings were adopted by the 
Commission; however, no apportionment was ordered. Subseauentl;-, 
in an amended order the Administrative Law Judge found that 
the applicant was entitled to additional benefits based on the 
4% increase in his permanent partial impairment. The Second In1ur~· 
Fund was ordered to reimburse the appellants on the basis of 4/24t~. 
or 16.6% of amounts paid by it for temporary total disability 
compensation and medical expenses. (R.152-153). 'T'he State Ins,;ra,:·. 
Fund then filed a Motion for Review for reimbursement from the Se:. 
Injury Fund and apportionment of benefits as required by § 35-1-69 
U.C.A. (R. 155-156) on the basis of 15/24 or a 62.5% reimbursement 
plus a reimbursement for the overpayment of permanent partial 
disability compensation. Plaintiffs Alvin G. Rhodes PUI"\f"l Sales ans 
State Insurance Fund now appeal the denial of that Motion (R. lsa-1; 
ARGUMENT 
I. SECTION 35-1-69 l.:.C.A. M!D CASF AUTHORITY RI:0l'IRE 
THAT THF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION APPORTION TEt\PORARY TC1fo' 
DISABILITY COMPENSATION AND 'IEDTCAL BENITITS BF:Tl!I'f'.: ~w 
SECOND INJURY FUND AND '."HE Lr·\PLOYEf' A!JD THAT THI sr.~ 
INJURY Fmm PAY FOR THE PPJ:-EXISTIIJG IMPl1TR.MJ:::T m· "Irr 
INJURED EMPLOYEE. 
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Before explaining why the Conunission's ruling should be 
reversed in this case, (except as to the 4/24 described above), it 
1 s helpful to make several introductory statements which are applicable 
to the concepts involved. First, plaintiffs do not dispute that the 
applicant William G. Rhodes is entitled to his compensation; they 
only raise the question of apportionment of this compensation between 
the Second Injury Fund and themselves as his employer and the employer's 
insurance carrier. 
Second, the Second Injury Fund was created in order to 
encourage employers to hire handicapped workers. Prior to the 
establishment of such a fund, an employer would be reluctant to hire 
the handicapped for the obvious reason that they are a higher 
risk group. They would be more susceptible to injury and a minor 
injury could result in a significantly more severe consequence such 
as longer periods off work, greater medical bills, and a higher 
likelihood of not being able to return to work at all. All of that 
potential liability would fall on the current employer. With the 
implementation of the Second Injury Fund concept, a disabled employee 
may receive full compensation for a disability resulting from an 
industrial injury as well as for his pre-existing impairments. However, 
the employer is responsible only for disability attributable to an 
accidental injury occurring in that particular employment. Northwest 
Carriers v.Industrial Conunission of Utah, 639 P.2a 138, 141 (1981). See 
also Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 634, (Utah 1980); 
I. ·1tc' '.'. Industrial Conunission of Utah, 604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1978); 
1 erson Workmen's Compensation Law, Section 59.31. 
Third, and very important to this case, is the principle 
that in light of the underlying purpose of the Second Iniury run~ 
an employer should be required to pay only the amount which t~c 
industrial accident added to the overall permanent impairment. 
Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board v. H. & M. Loq~inq Comoanv, 40, 
P.2d 98 (Alaska 1971), Cox v. Intermountain Lumber Company, 439 P.i: 
913 (Idaho 1968). See also Jacobsen Construction v. John rlonroe Ila 
I 
et. al., Utah Supreme Court No. 18469, June 29, 1983. I 
With these concepts in mind it now remains for us to exa" 
I 
the proper application of the present facts. There is no dispute ;~ 
the record developed before the Industrial CornJT1ission that Mr. R~odE' 
has a permanent combined impairment of 24% of the whole man which i: 
arrived at by combining the 15% due to the pre-existing conditions 
I 
and the 10% due to the industrial accident. (R. 159). The Industrii: I 
Commission, however, refused to limit the liability of Mr. Rhodes' 
employer at the time of his industrial accident to the accident o: 
May 1, 1978. This refusal is an arbitrary failure to comply w1•h t>,E 
express provisions of the Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-69, 1953, 
amended in 1974. That section mandates an aoportionment between the 
employer and the Second Injury Fund. ':'his section of the act, as it 
existed at the time of Mr. Rhodes' injury, orovided for the follo~1": 
apportionment of compensation: 
If any employee who has previously incurred a 
permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease, 
or congenital causes, sustained an industrial 
injury for which compensation and medical care 
is provided by this title that results in permanent 
incapacity, compensation and medical care, which 
medical care and other related items are outlined 
in Section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the basis 
of the combined injuries, but the liability of tho 
employer for such compensation and medical care 
shall be for the industrial injury onlv and the 
remainder shall be paid out of the special fund 
_f,_ 
provided for in Section 35-1-68(1) hereinafter 
referred to as the "special fund." 
A medical panel having the aualifications of the 
medical panel set forth in Section 35-2-56, shall 
review all medical aspects of the case and determine 
first, the total permanent physical impairment 
resulting from all causes and conditions including 
the industrial injury; second, the percentage of 
permanent physical impairment attributable to the 
industrial injury; and third, the percentage of 
permanent physical impairment attributable to previously 
existing conditions whether due to accident injury, 
disease, or congenital causes. The Industrial Commission 
shall then assess the liability for compensation and 
medical care to the employer on the basis of the 
percentage of the permanent physical impairment 
attributable to the industrial injury only and the 
remainder shall be payable out of the said special 
fund. Amou~ts, if any, which have been paid by the 
employer in excess of the portion attributable to the 
said industrial injury, shall be reimbursed to the 
employer out of the said special funds. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 (1953, as amended 1974) (emohasis added) 
As this Court has previously noted, the Industrial Commission 
has been reluctant over the years to comply with the requirements of 
this section. See, ~· Intermountain Smelting Coro. v. Capitano, 
suora. There is no question, however, that this Court has repeatedly and 
emphatically held that the apportionment provided for in Section 69 
must be made in all cases involving a pre-existing disability. 
See, ~ Intermountain Health Care v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977): 
lmite v. Industrial Commission of Utah, supra, Intermountain Smelting 
Corp v. Capitano, supra. 
But in the instant matter, only a "spirit of settlement" 
persuaded the Administrative Law Judge to amend his order and 
,,,,,,ire the Second Injury Fund to reimburse the plaintiffs herein 
1 
'" d upon a ratio of 4,124 or 16. 6% of all amounts paid, for 
terr,~orciry total disability compensation and medical expenses. No 
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reimbursement whatsoever was ordered for the permanent partial 
disability compensation overpayment even thouqh ~r. Rhoc1es' pre-
existing physical impairment and chronic alcholism were found tc 
have contributed 15/24 or 62.5% of the total impairment. The fail 
of the Commission to so order is contrary to statutory mandate ar.d 
all of the case authority interpreting Section 35-1-69 U.C.A. 
In Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Ca pi ta no, supra, the Medi cal oa·. 
found that the employee sustained a loss of bodily function of 25% 
with 16.5% attributable to the pre-existing injury and 8.5% of the 
result to the industrial accident. The court reversed the C:o!'1!'1iss1c· 
failure to apportion benefits and pay the applicant compensation foo 
his pre-exsiting impairment emphasizing that: 
compensation and medical care . shall 
be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries 
but the liability of the employer. . . sh al 1 be 
for the industrial injury only and the remainder 
shall be paid out of the special fund provided for 
J.n § 35-1-68. 
Similarly, in White v. Inc1ustrial Commission of Utah, sue: 
the applicant was suffering from a 10% permanent partial iMoairment, 
5% of which pre-dated the industrial in1ury and 5% of which was 
industrial. The medical panel also found that the applicant was 
temporarily totally disabled for 6 months. The Suoreme Court held 
the employer responsible for 5% of the 10% perManent partial impairc 
and for 50% of the temporary total disability compensation ana 50' 
of the medical expenses incurred. The Second 1n1ury Func1 WilS mace 
responsible for the remaining amounts. 
In Intermountain Health Care v. Orteqa, ~· tlie 
Commission found the claimant had a permanent partial impairment o! 
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30%, of which 10% was attributable to a pre-existing condition. In 
apportioning liability for medical expenses between the Second Injury 
f'und and the employer for partial impairment liability, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
(I)nasmuch as it appears that the pre-existing 
condition increased the resulting disability by 
one-third, it follows that under the requirements 
of the statute, the medical expenses as well as 
the compensation award should have been apportioned 
two-thirds from the employer and one third from 
the special fund. 
562 P.2d at 619. 
Likewise, 15/24 of Mr. Rhodes' permanent partial impairment 
was found to have directly resulted from pre-existing conditions 
aggravated by his May 1, 1978 industrial accident. It is the position 
of plaintiffs on appeal that Intermountain Smelting, elhite, 
and ~· are controlling. The Second Injury Fund is liable for 
15/24 of Mr. Rhodes' permanent partial impairment, and 62.5% of his 
medical expenses and temporary total compensation benefits. 
II. RFS JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFFS FROM BEING 
REIMBURSED BY THE SECOND INJURY FUND FOR MR. RHODES' PRF-
EXISTING CONDITION. 
Disallowing any reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund, 
the Administrative Law Judge stated: "No reimbursements are due to 
the State Insurance Fund . . since all questions concerning the 
applicant's condition were resolved as of July 23, 1980 (R. 132). 
As of July 23, 1980, no medical evidence of Mr. Rhodes' pre-existing 
1 crmcrnent partial impairment was available to plaintiffs. Therefore, 
"-existing conditons were not indicated as a part of Mr. Rhodes' 
11q1nal 20% permanent partial impairment by his treating physician. 
The Second Injury Fund was not made a party to the settlement, Jr~ 
plaintiffs absorbed total liability. It was later 111ade a finding 
of fact by the Commission that 15_/24 or 62.5\: of Mr. Rho•les' r<:r:--
partial impairment was the resu 1 t of pre-exist i:1q conditions. IR. 
The Commission by its order appears to be giving res judicata effec-
to the benefit of the Second Injury Fund of the Statement and Renu~' 
settlement between Mr. Rhodes and the appellants. (R. 126) 
This is another in a long line of efforts by the Industrie: 
Commission to find any means possible to protect the Second In1ury 
Fund which it administers. It is specious to give a nonparty to ar 
agreement and a nonbenef iciary of the agreement an unintended and 
unwarranted gift. That is what the Commission is attempting. More 
importantly, if the Second Injury Fund is allowed to escape 
liability here, future settlements would be discouraged and an 
extremely beneficial avenue for resolving litigation quickly would c' 
obstructed. It would result in an increased hearing case load 
because there would be no benefit in attempting to resolve 
compensation issues early with the injured employees. 
In addition to these policy considerations, Utah law 
is squarely against res judicata application here. A similar 
argument was proposed by the Second Injury Funn in Paoli v. Cotton1c 
Hospital, 656 P.2d 420 (Utah 1982). Therein, an injured e111ployee 
sought recovery for a pre-existing condition attributable to an 
industrial injury for which he had already been compensated unnri 
laws of another state. The Second Iniury Fund cointed out th~t 11 
potential liablity of the Fund had not been raised by either n1• 
the earlier action, and the Fund had not participaten in any settle 
or proceeding. 
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That is similar to the case at bar wherein the Potential liability 
of the Second In1ury Fund was not raised by any party prior to July 8, 
1982. In the instant matter, and the Second Injury Funn did not 
participate in the July 23, 1980, settlement between plaintiffs and Mr. 
Rhodes. 
In Paoli, the Utah Supreme Court carefully considered the 
purpose of the Second Injury Fund, and concluded as follows: 
(T)here may be cases where the Fund has elected not 
to participate and its presence has not been 
directed but where the Administrative Judge has 
entered an order against the Fund. In that event, 
the Fund should be allowed to reopen the case. 
in order to submit further evidence bearing on the 
special interest and liability of the Fund". That 
is what the Fund should be allowed to do on the 
remand on this case. 
As we interpret the statutory purpose and procedure, 
the Second Injury Fund llE"_ed not~e-~~ t~_\'ery 
workmen's comp_en§.9t_i_Qn_N~~dinq_j;ML1n~_11l tima~ely 
effect its-lnterests. But there is a proceeau~e by 
whlcn the partles--should notify the Fund as its 
potential interests become apparent, and whereby the 
Fund can, where necessary, compel the reopening of the 
hearing 
Id. at 423. 
So, the Second Injury Fund wants to have the right to 
reopen proceedings if it can benefit from the reopening, but if it 
is something that may be detrimental to it, it does not want to 
extend the same right to injured employees and employers. Plaintiffs 
on appeal ask that fairness and justice be a two way street. A 
settlement between an injured employee and his employer simply should 
n·1t preclude continuing procedings to determine the liability of the 
·,nnrl Injury Fund, if any. 
Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata does not prevent 
plaintiffs from reopening the July 23, 1980 settlement. As this 
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Court stated in International Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d SlS 
(Utah 1979): 
Concerning the doctrine of res judicata, it is 
often said that both the parties and issues must 
have been the same; and also that the 1udgment 
is conclusive, both as to issues which were actually 
tried and those which could have heen tried in the 
prior action. 
Id. at 516-517. 
Therefore, even if the pre-existing condition and Second Injury rur' 
liability issue could have been dealt with in July, 1980, the abser~ 
of the Second Injury Fund and lack of uniformity between the issues 
raised then and now prevent res judicata application here. And as 
indicated in Stevensen v. Bird, 636 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1981), '1f,f:. 
there are "different parties arguing over different points of law" • 
"are not bound" by the earlier decision or agreement. 
III. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ABUSED THE CONTINUING 
JURISDICTION VESTED IN IT BY SECTION 35-1-78 U.C.A. IN 
NOT ORDERING AN APPORTIONMENT AND REIMBURSEMENT AS REQUIRED 
BY THE EVIDENCE HEREIN. 
Even if the settlement agreement did have some effect on 
the Second Injury Fund, Section 35-1-78 U.C.A. gives the Comrnissior. 
authority to change the Second Injury Fund with its just responsibiL 
by its obligation of continuing jurisdiction over the matter: 
"The powers and 
Commission over 
and it may from 
or change . 
jurisdictions of the 
each case shall be continuing, 
time to time make such modification 
as in its opinion may be justified. 
It is arbitrary and capricious and manifestly unjust frr 
the Commission not to have granted the relief sought in this apr>r-
'~-
In its Amended Order, the Commission did modify and 
require reimbursement by the Second In-jury Fund as to 4/24 or 16.6% 
of Mr. Rhodes' temporary total disability compensation and medical 
cxtJenses. Such action makes no sense if the Commission's reasoning 
w0s correct. No mention was made therein of the other 10% to 11% also 
attributable to the pre-existing conditions. This omission is wholly 
without cause and is completely contrary to the result intended by 
application of Section 35-1-69 to the instant findings of fact. 
CONCLUSION 
When Mr. Rhodes was injured in an industrial accident on 
May 1, 1978, he was then suffering from pre-existing disabilities 
caused by previous accidents, disease process and/or chronic 
alcoholism. Uncontroverted medical evidence and findings of fact 
demonstrate that 15/24ths or 62.5% of Mr. Rhodes' disability is 
attributable to those pre-existing conditions. The Industrial 
Commission's action in imposing compensation liability upon the 
employer for the 20% of Mr. Rhodes' permanent partial impairment 
and in refusing to properly apportion liability for temporary total 
disability compensation and medical benefits and the further 
unwarranted refusal to order reimbursement from the Second Injury 
Fund of their share of the permanent partial disability compensation, 
was arbitrary and capricious, manifestly unjust and contrary to law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ).;2_Day of July, 1983. 
BLACK & MOORE 
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